NOV 27 — Most visitors to Japan, this writer included, are usually impressed by the politeness of the Japanese. Taxi drivers are not gruff, department store staff bow, hotel porters try their best to help.
In this light, the country's former Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda was rather un-Japanese when he denounced Dr Edwin Reischauer, America's envoy to Tokyo in the 1960s, a figure who was widely respected in Japan.
In 1981, Reischauer had spoken of a secret pact between the United States and Japan, whereby nuclear-armed US ships were allowed into Japan. This defied Japan's cherished “three 'no's” — that it shall not produce, possess or introduce nuclear arms.
“I have never met Dr Reischauer,” Sonoda told the Japanese Diet. “But he is an uncalled-for meddler who pokes his nose into matters that are absolutely none of his business.”
Nearly 30 years later, the issue of the secret pact has popped up again.
The new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government led by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has vowed to investigate the issue. It has ordered Foreign Ministry staff to plough through reams of documents to ascertain if such a pact exists.
Earlier this week, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said the DPJ would soon “set the record straight” on the issue. “We'll be unburdening ourselves of the insistence of past governments that a secret agreement did not exist,” he added.
In reality, the “secret” pact is an open secret, like Israel's nuclear weapons. The National Security Archive website at George Washington University, for example, keeps a long list of declassified documents proving the pact exists. But it has remained “secret” thus far, because successive American and Japanese governments have wanted it that way.
Meeting then-Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira in April 1963, Reischauer came up with two “understandings” that have since undergirded the pact.
Firstly, the transit of nuclear-armed American warships through Japanese ports did not constitute the “introduction” or installation of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. The 1960 US-Japan military treaty required “prior consultations” if US warships were to “introduce” such arms into Japan.
Secondly, Reischauer reviewed the US policy of “neither confirming nor denying” (NCND) the presence of nuclear weapons — a policy that the US Navy still practises today.
Taken together, the two understandings represented an example of circular logic: “Prior consultations” would only be needed if nuclear weapons were “introduced” — that is, installed — in Japan. If no “prior consultations” had occurred, this would mean that no nuclear weapons had been “introduced” into Japan.
“In public, Japanese governments stood by the nuclear ban devoutly... In private, however, governments maintained a more pro-nuclear disposition epitomised by tacit acceptance of the nuclear ambiguity demanded by the NCND policy,” wrote Dr Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists.
Of course, Hatoyama is free to disclose to the Japanese people the complicity of previous Liberal Democratic Party governments in this policy. After all, the clandestine deal was not the DPJ's doing.
But arguably, the secret pact is also moot, since the US banned the carrying of tactical nuclear weapons on military vessels and planes in 1991. By disclosing the existence of the pact, however, the Hatoyama government risks fraying the alliance, upon which the security of Japan — and the security of the Asia-Pacific — depends.
For one thing, the US nuclear posture in Asia is predicated on its NCND policy. By maintaining strategic ambiguity about its nuclear weapons, the US — and by extension its allies Japan, South Korea and Australia — is better-placed to manage potential conflicts, say, in the Taiwan Straits and the Korean peninsula. It is always beneficial to keep potential enemies guessing about one's intentions.
“The US still follows a strict 'neither confirm nor deny' policy in discussing the presence of US nuclear weapons anywhere to avoid precedents that could limit its flexibility or threaten operational security during periods of crisis or conflict,” wrote Brad Glosserman and Mr Ralph Cossa in a recent report by Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based think-tank.
The same consideration would apply to Hatoyama's suggestion that the US declare a 'no first use' policy regarding nuclear weapons, they argue. This “moral high road” stance would be popular, but it would cripple American and Japanese options in a potential conflict.
Some argue that to maintain the US-Japan alliance and deter potential enemies, Tokyo should revise its three “no's” to two “no's” — by dropping the one forbidding the introduction of nuclear weapons. But this would be difficult, given the Japanese people's aversion to nuclear weapons.
As the DPJ government pushes for transparency, however, it should take care that it does not compromise an alliance that is critical to regional security.
In 1984, an anti-nuclear government in New Zealand barred the entry of nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered US warships. This led to the US suspending its alliance obligations to New Zealand.
Washington had a clear choice then: either maintain its alliance with Wellington or stick to the “neither confirm nor deny”. It decided to stick with the latter, for it was essential to its operational flexibility and the region's security.
One hopes Tokyo does not push Washington down the same road as Wellington did. — The Straits Times
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Japan was badly beaten by the Western powers and hit by Nukes. The collusion between West LDP to introduce Nukes to Japan is disrespectful to the citizens of Japan who made their stand on WMDs and warlike behaviour clear. The questionable presence of Caucaso-Western military bases which still exist throughout Japan, is disrespectful to the citizens of Asia in general and makes everyone in the region wonder if Japan is a mere lapdog of the West instead of a sovereign nation or using proxies to project it's power instead this time around.
This is the Far Orient, there is no place for NWOs or Whitey, even if they hide behind the Japanese. Does Japan realise this is causing much distrust among other regional states who still have living populations of older generation citizens that remember the depredations of the Japanese during WW2?
Honesty and transparency is the best policy and that also includes admission of wrongdoings at least commensurate with what Germany has offered thus far - not backdoor deals that further blacken Japan's reputation. PM Yukio looks set to pursue pro-neighbouring state stance which will, if honest and transparent to ASEAN+3 and cautious and opaque to the West, will go far in kindling better ties locally in time.