NOV 30 - The current protests at the US$4 billion Suvarnabhumi International Airport and the old Don Muang Airport in the heart of Bangkok are unprecedented in the recent history of Thailand.
Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat, the brother-in-law of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, was forced to land at Chiang Mai airport to the north of the country and will not return to Bangkok until it is safe
for him and the Cabinet to return. As Prime Minister, however, he cannot remain in Chiang Mai indefinitely and will eventually have to return to Bangkok to face the music.
If Somchai falls from power, he is likely to be charged in court by the groups that are currently demanding his resignation and who want to topple his government. Whether or not Somchai reaches that stage is not a
question of "why" but a question of "when".
One of the strongest anti-Somchai groups is the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and it is limited to the greater Bangkok area. The PAD is intent on building up the pressure until Somchai resigns and fresh elections are called. The PAD's main beef is with anyone associated with Thaksin.
For the first time in months, army strongman General Anupong Paochinda is in a quandary. The government insists that Gen Anupong's men move in to get rid of the protesters while the protesters themselves demand that Gen Anupong stage a coup against the Somchai government.
Why should a legitimate government depend on one general? Surely there are many senior officers who are waiting in the wings to assume command over the army? Unfortunately for Somchai, for the past five months, Gen Anupong has entrenched his position and exerted his authority by removing unsuitable officers from sensitive units such as the First Army, which is tasked with protecting Bangkok itself.
Gen Anupong is also reported to be a close aide to former prime minister and current Privy Counsellor General Prem Tinsulanonda. Gen Prem is a devoted royalist and one of the most trusted advisers to the King. For these reasons, it is not easy to simply replace Gen Anupong.
Thailand is peaking towards a penultimate clash between the PAD, the People Power Party-led government, other civilian groups, and the military. Even if Gen Anupong is replaced by a more compliant general, it would take several weeks to replace officers and commanders loyal to Gen Anupong with those who might be willing to be loyal to the Prime Minister.
Unfortunately for Somchai, he has never commanded a military unit and is not an army general. This was similar to the case of Thaksin, who was promoted to a (Police) General but was never an army general either.
Neither was Somchai's predecessor, ousted prime minister Samak Sundaravej.
As the protesters push for what they see as the endgame, it is timely to look at Thai protests in their historical context: Underlying Thai protests are a larger phenomenon - a protest culture - that acts as a powerful response to weak government. The Thai protest culture manifests itself especially in times of weak governance.
The Thai protest culture arises when the state experiences policy failure, loss of public confidence, erosion of moral authority, or any combination of the three.
Policy failure occurs when the state cannot deliver the goods. In Thailand, one of many clear examples was the misallocation of state funds and the virtual absence of tax regulation enforcement by the authorities in the 1990s. Other examples of state policy failures include serious problems in electricity, water supply, and health provisions in the rural areas.
A loss of public confidence occurs when the state is unable to persuade the people to follow its lead. If the state is illustrated as a train engine speeding its way into the Gulf of Thailand, then the passengers would probably try to find a way to get off the train.
Examples of the loss of confidence in the government-of-the- day include the 1975 Seni Pramoj and Kukrit Pramoj governments; Chuan Leekpai's multifactional government in the 1990s; and most recently, the case of
the maverick cooking show host-turned prime minister Samak Sundaravej this year.
The erosion of public confidence is also marked by widespread looting and demonstrations of civil disobedience. The historical inability of the Bangkok Metropolitan Police to prevent widespread rioting is well known since power in Bangkok grows out of the barrel of army guns and not police pistols.
Erosion of the moral authority to govern is a third way in which a protest culture may arise. A good example was during the dictatorship of prime minister Thanom Kittikachorn in the early 1970s. The date Oct 14 is
symbolically important because it marks the day in 1973 when thousands of protesters, including Thammasat University students, were injured and killed while protesting against the government. The loss of moral
authority ended with large-scale protests where hundreds were killed by police.
The embattled government of Prime Minister Somchai today demonstrates the clear erosion of the incumbent government's moral authority. Because he did not move to replace Gen Anupong soon after he took office, he has virtually lost control of the one element in Thai society that could have physically prevented PAD from taking over the two main airports.
Change is effected by ousting the prime minister and replacing him with someone more capable. These protesters resort to protests and violence because they believe that there is widespread systemic corruption. They believe that as individuals they are powerless but as a group they have tremendous influence.
Thai analysts from various universities tend to believe that there are larger unseen hands who are funding these protests.
Any visitor to a public protest site will be amazed at the level of organisation and logistical support involved. The past five months have shown that the protest sites have electricity generators; toilet facilities; protest T-shirts, footwear, street food and drinks for sale. At one point there were some makeshift stalls providing amusement for the children who accompanied their parents.
The culture of public protests in Thailand has become a national pastime and a rite of passage for many Bangkok teenagers, older Bangkok residents, and even new Thai politicians.
In a country where millions are impoverished, even in the capital city, protest culture affords a certain form of real political entertainment that is broadcast over the Internet and the global media. Rural Thai people, on the other hand, are either too exhausted from working on their farms or simply prefer watching their countrymen risking their lives on national television.
Those who know the Bangkok protest culture will give the protesters a wide berth. This is because it is not uncommon for improvised explosive devices to be set off by rival groups and those who are simply mischievous. Protest culture as a national pastime is about the articulation of political interests that are not limited to peaceful civil disobedience.
Protesters can disagree with all government policies but chances are that the authorities will not seek the maximum penalty under the law.
However, any protester or individual, whether foreign or local, who casts any aspersion on the king and the royal family will find himself in deep trouble. Gen Anupong himself recently cautioned individuals against
besmirching the good name of the monarchy. To an extent, it is a credit to Gen Anupong that the military did not intervene during the previous Samak administration.
But the non-intervention by the First Army Region during the inchoate stages of the demonstrations has given the PAD immense confidence to pursue their goals. This is why the PAD protesters have worn yellow T-shirts to remind all and sundry that they are loyal to their King.
Gen Anupong did not intervene in previous weeks for three reasons. First, he did not receive the assent of the Thai king or the king's Privy Counsellors to make that move. He also did not want to get the army involved in any bloodshed and tarnish the military's image.
This is because once its tanks move against the demonstrators, it becomes a "command and control" nightmare to prevent violence from breaking out. Apart from the 2006 bloodless coup against Thaksin, most of the previous 18 successful coups in Thailand involved political violence.
The second reason for turning a blind eye to the PAD demonstrations over the past five months was that Gen Anupong believed that the military ought to remain the final arbiter of justice. It was a kind of unwritten
professional code of ethics that belonged to his class of military officers.
The third reason was about power. The Thai army perceives itself as the traditional guardian of power and has been since 1932. The military commanders will defend the king against foreigners and locals and rationalise their actions based on the majeste laws. - The Straits Times
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