BAGHDAD, Sept 7 – Talks on a coalition government have come full circle in Iraq six months after an election that produced no clear winner and which has pitted a Sunni-backed alliance against the country’s main Shi’ite-led factions.
A resolution to the impasse appears as distant as ever as politicians fight over top positions, in particular that of prime minister, and public impatience, despair and disillusionment with Iraq’s democratic experiment are mounting.
Attacks by Sunni Islamist insurgents seeking to exploit the vacuum and to whip up mistrust in the security forces after the end to US combat operations on August 31 continue unabated.
Suicide assaults and assassinations of officials and anti-al Qaeda militia leaders are stoking fears of a return to broader violence just as Iraq emerges from the worst of the bloodshed and chaos set off after the 2003 US-led invasion.
The incumbent prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, whose State of Law coalition came second in the March 7 election with 89 seats in the 325-seat parliament, has remained steadfast in his aim to win a second term. But some of his Shi’ite allies remain equally determined to oppose him.
The vote leader, ex-premier Iyad Allawi’s cross-sectarian but Sunni-backed Iraqiya alliance, has also been unable to gain a governing majority. Iraqiya won 91 seats.
The Shi’ite-led Iraqi National Alliance, which includes the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (ISCI) and fiery anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, recently nominated former vice-president Adel Abdul-Mahdi for prime minister, challenging Maliki’s bid.
But even that deal may have evaporated after some Sadrists became angry with ISCI, and amid talk of a rupture within ISCI itself. Some ISCI leaders appear to prefer Maliki, strengthening his chances despite INA’s nomination of Abul-Mahdi.
The following are some scenarios as Iraqis grapple with their tenuous democracy 7-1/2 years after the invasion.
At first, it seemed inevitable a Shi’ite mega merger between State of Law and the INA would sideline Iraqiya.
But the INA’s main player, ISCI, whittled to a rump of its former influence among majority Shi’ites by Maliki’s growing stature, resolutely opposed his demand for a second term.
Sadr, whose followers have fumed since Maliki sent the army to crush their Mehdi Army militia in 2008, refused to back him.
ISCI and the Sadrists last week tentatively agreed to stage a contest between Maliki and Abdul-Mahdi. But INA and State of Law have yet to agree to a mechanism for choosing between them.
In the end, few expect the Shi’ite majority to sacrifice their unity. The power Shi’ites gained after the fall of Sunni dictator Saddam Hussein is simply too precious.
Shi’ite Iran, which exerts considerable influence over many Iraqi Shi’ite leaders after housing them for years when they were exiled under Saddam, is also pushing for a united front.
While Tehran might have misgivings about Maliki, Iranian leaders no doubt prefer him to Allawi, viewed as a secular strongman by his supporters and by Iran as a Shi’ite frontman for Sunni adherents of Saddam’s now outlawed Baath party.
Both Maliki’s State of Law and the INA have pursued talks with Iraqiya, but they may have been intended more to pressure each other than as serious efforts to strike a deal with Allawi.
At the same time, there have been indications that State of Law and Maliki’s Dawa party might eventually abandon Maliki and anoint another candidate not opposed by their INA partners.
Dawa’s problem is that Maliki is the politician who won the most votes in the election and most Dawa lawmakers owe their seats to his popularity. Betraying him would be embarrassing.
The alternative candidates mentioned are close confidants:
- Ali al-Adeeb: The most senior Dawa alternative, Adeeb does not owe his seat to Maliki, but his credentials are tainted by a widespread belief that he has Iranian nationality.
- Haider al-Abadi: a senior Dawa member, Abadi is an urbane politician with broad respect but owes his seat to Maliki.
- Hussain al-Shahristani: The oil minister is a former Dawa member but is viewed as a technocrat and not a political leader.
Talks between State of Law and Iraqiya were abandoned in mid-August because Allawi was angered by Maliki referring to Iraqiya as Sunni. A few days later, the talks resumed but the vitriol displayed in the dispute suggested any affinity between the two was skin-deep and chances of an agreement were remote.
It is, nevertheless, an alliance that is being actively pushed by US officials who are hoping that the next government will include as many of Iraq’s major communities as possible. Political buy-in is seen as essential if Iraq’s Sunni minority is to stop supporting a weakened yet resilient insurgency.
In the American vision, Maliki becomes prime minister and Allawi heads a National Security Council that has considerable control of the military and police apparatus.
Agreement has been stymied by Maliki’s insistence that the PM’s authority not be diluted by giving the council a veto. Iraqiya also insists it should have the premier’s position.
Other solutions have also been presented:
- Maliki remains as PM and an Iraqiya figure other than Allawi takes the presidency, with Allawi heading the National Security Council.
- Maliki becomes prime minister, and Allawi president. This is hard to imagine. Sunnis say they would regard Allawi as an honorary Sunni if he is prime minister but not if he is president. Kurds would likely object to this scenario as well.
- Maliki becomes prime minister, and Iraqiya picks half the government. This scenario is possible but it hinges on Sunni leaders within Iraqiya sacrificing Allawi or on Allawi sacrificing himself for the benefit of Iraqiya.
Iraqiya combined with Maliki’s State of Law would have 180 seats in parliament. An Iraqiya deal with INA would have 161.
Under one scenario, INA would get the PM post, Iraqiya would take the presidency and the Kurds would have the speaker of parliament. This is considered unlikely as the Kurds, who hold the presidency, would object, and Maliki’s State of Law would effectively become the opposition.
US officials stress that they have no preferred candidate but want a government that gives all of Iraq’s communities a voice as US troops withdraw over the next 16 months.
Privately, though, many US officials would like to see a solution that excludes from government the Sadrists, who are viewed as unpredictable and disruptive.
The Sadrists are fiercely opposed to the US presence, and might demand either a speedier pullout or guarantees US forces are not allowed to remain beyond their end-2011 withdrawal date.
Oil majors investing in Iraq’s oilfields may also prefer this solution – the Sadrists are the main critics of contracts the companies signed with the outgoing government. – Reuters
